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Living on the edge: precariousness and
why it matters for health
Martin McKee1* , Aaron Reeves2, Amy Clair3 and David Stuckler3
Abstract
The post-war period in Europe, between the late 1940s and the 1970s, was characterised by an expansion of the
role of by the state, protecting its citizens from risks of unemployment, poverty, homelessness, and food insecurity.
This security began to erode in the 1980s as a result of privatisation and deregulation. The withdrawal of the state
further accelerated after the 2008 financial crisis, as countries began pursuing deep austerity. The result has been a
rise in what has been termed ‘precariousness’. Here we review the development of the concept of precariousness
and related phenomena of vulnerability and resilience, before reviewing evidence of growing precariousness
in European countries. It describes a series of studies of the impact on precariousness on health in domains of
employment, housing, and food, as well as natural experiments of policies that either alleviate or worsen these
impacts. It concludes with a warning, drawn from the history of the 1930s, of the political consequences of
increasing precariousness in Europe and North America.
Keywords: Precariousness, Social determinants of health, Health policy
Social and economic security: the post-war
consensus
One of the greatest achievements of post-war Western
Europe, between the late 1940s and 1970s, was to provide
security for its people. One element was collective security
from external threats, in the form of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) [1]. The other was security
from internal threats, summarised in the United Kingdom
by William Beveridge as “the five giant evils” of society:
“Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor, and Idleness”. The
struggle against these giants was the foundation of the
post-war British welfare state [2].
The desire for security among politicians and the popu-
lation in the 1950s and 1960s was understandable. This
was a generation that had lived through the depression of
the 1930s and the Second World War. Many Europeans
had lived with deep uncertainty for many years.
One example was Willem Drees, who served four
terms as Dutch Prime Minister in the 1940s and 1950s.
He had been imprisoned in Buchenwald at the onset of
World War II [3]. Released after a year, he worked with
clandestine organisations providing support for the poor,
and especially those in the underground and those who
lacked links to some of the religious charities that
retained support from the collaborationist administra-
tion. He was all too aware of the meaning of insecurity,
including insecurity of life itself. Immediately after the
liberation in 1945 he became minister of social affairs,
responsible for creating a new system of old age pensions,
using emergency provisions to do so, and greatly
expanding the role of the state in providing social
assistance.
In the wake of World War II, politicians across Europe
from the right and the left, were establishing new pro-
grammes and systems of governance that would provide
security for their populations, aided by the resources
provided by the Marshall Plan and the accompanying
forgiveness of debt [4]. In the United Kingdom (UK), the
post-war Labour government seized the opportunities
provided by the end of the war to create the National
Health Service. Nye Bevan, the Minister of Health,
launched a compulsory national insurance system that
would protect everyone “from the cradle to the grave”
[5]. From the other end of the political spectrum, French
President Charles de Gaulle resisted pressure from
leading industrialists who were opposed to expanding
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health insurance, pointing out that while the French
people had been suffering and, in many cases, dying
under the Nazi occupation, the industrialists had been
collaborating with the occupiers [6].
Each of these politicians was putting into practice,
albeit unknowingly, the situation that the American moral
philosopher John Rawls would later describe in his Theory
of Justice [7]. This involves a group of individuals deciding
what a just society would look like. However, unlike the
usual situation, in which they create rules and procedures
knowing whether they will benefit themselves, these indi-
viduals do so from behind a “veil of ignorance”. They
make their decisions ignorant of whether they are black or
white, rich or poor, male or female, healthy or disabled, or
any and more combinations. The resulting society will be
one in which access to certain basic freedoms are guaran-
teed for all, but also that the structures of society must
protect the most disadvantaged, ensuring equality of
opportunity to take advantage of these freedoms, whatever
befalls them and wherever they end up.
By the late 1950s, Europe’s leaders were those who
had learned the lessons of the 1930s and 1940s and were
determined not to repeat the mistakes of the past. In
these ways, the resulting post-war settlement saw the
state and employers take on many risks once borne by
individuals and families. This newly created social security
allowed people to look to the future with confidence,
contributing to marked improvements in health and well-
being. And this was based on a political consensus. Harold
Macmillan, the British Conservative prime minister in the
1950s, boasted that his proudest achievement was building
large amounts of social housing [8]. This, in large part,
reflected the sense of solidarity that he had developed as
an officer in the trenches with his working class soldiers
in the first world war [9].
The retreat of the state
Memories fade. The 1980s were a time of change, at least
in the English-speaking world. Ronald Reagan was elected
as American President. Margaret Thatcher became British
prime minister. Together, they gave their names to a new
philosophy, neoliberalism, characterised by a shrinkage in
the size of the state, with both privatisation of state owned
enterprises, weakening of unions and collective bar-
gaining, and retrenchment of the welfare state [10].
Yet there was a limit. Even Thatcher retained many of
the elements of the welfare state and kept many key
elements of the economy in public ownership [11]. It
was in low and middle income countries where this
ideology was pursued with most vigour, in pursuit of
the so-called Washington Consensus [12].
It not until was much later that the situation changed
in the advanced industrialised countries in Europe. The
year was 2008, and the cause was a sequence of events
far away [13]. Banks in the United States had accumu-
lated vast cash reserves, including large sums from Chinese
investors, and they needed to do something with them. The
ingenuity of the bankers knew no bounds. High salaries
attracted a new generation, with a new set of skills, into the
financial services sector. Tragically, many of the new gener-
ation had little idea about what they were doing either.
The large sums of cash that the banks were sitting on
were being moved around the world, looking for a home.
They found one, in mortgage-backed securities in the
United States of America (USA). People who could
never have imagined owning their own home now could,
by borrowing at unimaginably low rates. The problems
began when interest rates rose. Governments gave a very
large amount of our money to save the banks, what is
now termed “welfare for Wall Street”, leaving none for
the ordinary people. Many of these ordinary people had,
until then, been coping, but only just.
The situation got worse when their employers started
laying people off. Unemployment rose rapidly, placing a
burden on social protection systems just at the time
when government resources were scarce. The obvious
answer was to reduce welfare budgets. In fact, while all
countries did cut spending, not all cut welfare [14].
They had a choice and they differed in what they cut.
Some did raise taxes, especially those on income and
capital gains that would impact most on the rich,
including the bankers who had been the beneficiaries
of their largesse. However, in many countries, those
who had previously enjoyed some degree of job security
lost it.
Most of those who lost jobs did find new ones, but
the new ones were much less secure [15]. The term
‘zero-hours’ contract entered the vocabulary in some
countries. This is exemplified by the contract that
British employees of the sandwich chain Subway must
sign, stating that “The company has no duty to pro-
vide you with work. Your hours of work are not pre-
determined and will be notified to you on a weekly
basis as soon as is reasonably practicable in advance
by your store manager. The company has the right to
require you to work varied or extended hours from
time to time.” These contracts are beneficial to some
people, especially mothers returning to the labour
market as their children grow up, because they are
flexible. However, while these groups do so by choice
and have some degree of control over their working
arrangements, the rapid rise in zero-hours contracts
was seen in those who were underemployed, desiring
to work more hours than were available.
What is now emerging is a new class of workers,
whose lives are characterised by insecure and unstable
employment – or what is referred to as precariousness,
which we expand on below.
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The concept of precariousness
French writers studying the nature of work had long
recognised that there was a group within the population
whose lives could be characterised as precarious, invoking
the concept of précarité de l’emploi. In France, this was
seen as something to be countered by politicians of both
the right, such as Jacques Chirac, and left, such as Francois
Hollande. Pitrou, who used the term extensively, identified
a set of characteristics that defined précarité [16]. These
included some elements related to employment, such as
low skills, low wages, and harsh working conditions. How-
ever, they also included economic insecurity, inadequate
housing, health problems, and lack of social networks.
Crucially, precariousness was not the same as poverty,
although clearly most people whose lives were precarious
were also poor. Other French writers, such as Paugam, have
developed this concept further, introducing ideas such as
précarité de travail, where the employee is engaged in
activities that generate little value, are tedious or
repetitive, and attract few rewards, intellectually or
financially [17]. More recently, the idea has been ex-
tended beyond the conditions of the individual, to
describe what is seen as a shift in society to one in
which new forms of irregular and uncertain employ-
ment dominate [18].
English-speaking writers were also concerned about
the changing nature of work. In general, they focussed
on what was termed flexibility. While some politicians
argued that this was an inevitable accompaniment of
technological change and global competition, [19] some,
such as Sennett [20] and Reich, [21] were concerned and
they too invoked the term precarious.
The situation changed, at least in England, in 2013, with
the publication of the results of the Great British Class
Survey [22]. This survey included 160,000 predominantly
white and predominantly English residents of the UK. It
sought to update the Registrar General’s classification of
class, introduced in 1923, and which had provided the basis
for a wealth of research on social inequalities. The British
survey derived class from an individual’s economic, cultural,
and social capital. Economic capital was defined as income
and assets. Cultural capital was the amount and type of
cultural interests and activities. Social capital was the
quantity and social status of an individual’s friends, family,
and business contacts. It drew heavily on Pierre Bourdieu’s
theory of social distinction [23]. It identified seven con-
temporary classes, starting with the Elite, followed by the
Established middle class, the Technical middle class, and
then the New affluent workers, the Traditional working
class, and finally, the Emergent service sector and, right at
the bottom, the Precariat, a term that combined the words
precariousness and proletariat. This term was popularised
by Guy Standing, who saw it as an inevitable consequence
of developments such as information technology and the
concentration of power by a small group who accumu-
lated an increasing share of global wealth [24].
Precariousness is a complex, multifaceted concept.
Nettleton and Burrows wrote of “the spread of greater
labour market flexibility, greater job insecurity, a greater
fragility in relationships and a weakening in the formal
provision of social welfare” [25]. Beer and colleagues
noted how “the concepts of precarious housing and pre-
carious employment make direct reference to the marginal
position of many households” [26]. Kalleberg argued that
“[precarious] employment…is uncertain, unpredictable,
and risky from the point of view of the worker”, [18] while
Gill and Pratt argue that “Precariousness (in relation to
work) refers to all forms of insecure, contingent, flexible
work – from illegalised, casualised and temporary employ-
ment, to homeworking, piecework and freelancing” [27].
What these statements have in common is the view
that those whose lives are precarious face uncertainty
and risk in several areas, including employment, income,
and housing. It is linked to what has been termed the
privatisation of risk [28]. The term “precariousness” also
features in the literature on these individual issues. For
example, the International Labour Organization notes
how “precarious work is a means for employers to shift
risks and responsibilities on to workers” [29]. For
example, researchers on housing policy have noted how
mortgage providers seek to transfer risk from themselves
to those who are borrowing from them, demanding ever
higher deposits for housing purchases, forcing them to
spend more, and diverting them to what is in many
countries intrinsically insecure private rented sector.
Politicians often frame these moves as giving individuals
back control, an argument that has intuitive appeal, but
which can equally be interpreted as telling people that
they are on their own [28].
Precariousness, resilience, and vulnerability
To understand how precariousness relates to other
terms with which it is often used, we turn to the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) 2014 Human
Development Report [30]. It notes a “widespread sense
of precariousness in the world today-in livelihoods, in
personal security, in the environment, and in global
politics”. Although precariousness is not actually defined,
a search of the report yields many examples of how the
term “precarious/precariousness” is used to describe the
circumstances in which many people live, including infor-
mal employment, threat of conflict, natural disasters, lack
of civil, economic and social rights, and exposures to food
price hikes. Although the report does not refer to the
literature cited above, it is clear that the ideas are closely
aligned.
Those whose lives are precarious may be rendered
“vulnerable”. This is especially so if they have limited
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capabilities, for example because they have low reserves
of human, economic and social capital. For example,
savings or home ownership will, all else being equal, be
expected to be protective, as will a supportive social or
family network and the means to access justice or other
ways to assert their rights. However, even those who do
have such capabilities may find them eroded when faced
with repeated shocks, with the effect extending beyond
the individual to subsequent generations. These cap-
abilities also vary over the life course. People with pre-
carious lives may also become vulnerable because of
what is termed restricted social competences. This re-
fers to what social institutions can do.
The UNDP 2014 Human Development Report asks
three questions to help understand vulnerability. Who is
vulnerable? To what? And Why? For example, the poor,
informal workers, and those who are socially excluded
are vulnerable to economic and health shocks. Similarly,
whole communities may be vulnerable, to conflict and
civil unrest, because of low social cohesion, unresponsive
institutions and poor governance.
The final term to be considered is resilience. This term
is used in different ways in different disciplines but here
it is taken to mean “social resilience”, defined as “the
capacity of individuals or groups to secure favourable
outcomes under new circumstances and, if need be, by
new means” [31] while the same idea is captured by
Luthar and colleagues, seeing it as the dynamic ability of
individuals, communities and entire societies to adapt
positively to shocks [32].
In normal circumstances, there is no way of knowing
how resilient an individual or a society is. It is only when
they are tested by being exposed to a shock that one can
possibly know. History provides many examples of people
and communities who summoned seemingly superhuman
reserves of courage, commitment, and endurance that no
one could have anticipated. In contrast, there are many
people who aspired to leadership but who failed to rise to
the challenge, when it came. It is obvious, given that most
people are never tested in this way, that this is an
extremely difficult topic to research. Indeed, in the health
field, this work has drawn on that of Antonovsky, who
tried to understand what was special about those people
who survived the concentration camps when so many did
not [33]. A systematic review of individual level factors
associated with resilience in the face of economic shocks
impacting on healthy found evidence to implicate ten
separate factors, from gender and marital status to in-
come, attitudes, and social relations [34].
It is important to note that precariousness can cut across
traditional classifications of social position or class, based
on socio-economic status, employment status, or educa-
tion. Individuals can be in a state of precariousness even if
they are well-educated and in employment-which in
conventional social epidemiology would appear favourable-
if, for example, that employment is insecure and they have
no assets on which to fall back. A contemporary example is
provided by junior doctors in the British National Health
Service [35]. Although they would seem to be exceptionally
privileged, in terms of income and, to some degree, job
security, they have no idea, from one week to the next,
what hours they will work, or from one year to the next to
what part of the country they will be sent. This makes it vir-
tually impossible for anyone with family responsibilities to
juggle their multiple commitments. Unsurprisingly, morale
is rock bottom, rates of burnout are increasing rapidly, and
large numbers are abandoning the profession. This is also a
major problem in New Zealand [36].
It is also important to note that precariousness may be
perceived, even if not objectively demonstrable. An indi-
vidual’s perception may be different from the reality, but is
nonetheless important and likely to affect their health and
well-being. Indeed, while it is clear that job loss is bad for
health, there is also considerable evidence that the harmful
effects can appear much earlier, coinciding with the antici-
pation of future problems, regardless of whether those an-
ticipated difficulties ever materialise [37].
In summary, those whose lives are precarious are at
greater risk of a shock, such as job or housing loss, and
if it occurs they are also at risk of a cascade of events
over which they have little control, and few reserves on
which to draw, thereby reducing their resilience.
The state as a protector
The institutions of society and, in particular, government,
can reduce the numbers of people whose lives are pre-
carious and protect them from its consequences, redu-
cing the risk of a shock and by mitigating its effects
should it occur, for example by creating safety nets. As
Vives and colleagues note, “a strong welfare state pro-
tects workers” from the consequences of employment
precariousness [38]. This lesson has been relearned
during the global financial crisis that began in 2008.
The crisis has had profound consequences for health
(Table 1) [39] but the responses that have been adopted
have provided many natural experiments, both good
and bad, that shed light on the health consequences
when those whose lives are precarious face a shock,
such as the loss of a job or a home. In the following
sections, we explore how the institutions of the state
either protect or, in some cases, fail to protect those
who face precariousness in relation to employment,
work, housing, and food security.
Précarité de l’emploi –precariousness of
employment
A study of the impact of job loss on mental health among
Greeks in 2009, before the worst of the austerity package,
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and in 2011 when it was in full force and when many
more Greeks were living lives that were precarious, found
that job loss was associated with deteriorating mental
health in both periods but the impact was very much
greater in the context of austerity [40]. Thus, both
vulnerability, or the probability of losing one’s job, and
the adverse effects that resulted because of a loss of
social resilience, were exacerbated by the wider eco-
nomic situation.
Yet there is evidence that policies which reduce pre-
cariousness are beneficial against such hazards. Theresa
May, the British Prime Minister, has made much of her
desire to help those she describes as just about man-
aging. One reason that many people are just about man-
aging is that they are paid very little. This means that, if
misfortune should befall them, they will have few if any
financial resources to fall back on. Yet, some years ago,
the situation was even worse as there was no minimum
wage. But can an increase in a few pence make a dif-
ference? The introduction of the minimum wage in
the UK, in 1999, was a natural experiment [41]. A
study using longitudinal data tracked three groups of
people. The first was those who were below the
threshold and who saw an increase in their income.
The second comprised those who were just above it,
and so derived no benefit. The third comprised those
who were below it and stayed there because the policy
was inadequately enforced. There was a significant
improvement in mental health, but only among those
whose incomes increased, and thus whose lives were
marginally less precarious. Although they only had a
few more pence each hour, the size of the effect was
considerable, equating to that seen among people pre-
scribed anti-depressants. For some people, a small
change can make a big difference.
Précarité de travail – precariousness of work
France has experienced an epidemic of workplace suicides,
with increasing numbers of employees choosing to kill
themselves in the face of extreme pressures at work [42].
Suicides have affected a wide range of companies and
sectors including postal services, car manufacturing, tele-
communications, electricity and gas, banks, supermarkets,
research centre and call centres. In a number of cases,
individuals have left letters, subsequently published in the
press, in which they explicitly blame work or conditions at
work as the cause of their actions. Others have chosen to
kill themselves in a highly visible or symbolic way,
returning to work to take their own lives, for example
by hanging themselves in their offices, to make clear
the connections between their suicide and work. In
July 2016, Paris prosecutors announced that the
former chief executive of the telecoms provider, France
Télécom, now rebranded as Orange, and six senior man-
agers may face criminal charges in relation to suicides
among its employees. This follows an earlier case when a
French court of appeal found the car manufacturer,
Renault, guilty of gross negligence regarding three suicides
at the company.
At least the French government has recognised that
this is a problem. Any suicide at work is considered
work-related until proven otherwise, and suicides out-
side work are investigated as work-related if family
members can show evidence suggesting a link. In con-
trast, in the United Kingdom, even those suicides
committed in the workplace are presumed to be indi-
vidual and voluntary acts and the relevant legislation
states that ‘All deaths to workers and non-workers,
with the exception of suicides, must be reported if
they arise from a work-related accident’ [43].
Precarité de lodgement – precariousness of
housing
We now look beyond Paugam’s writing on employment
and work, although for consistency we retain the use of
French terminology. People may also feel precarious
because of concerns about having somewhere to live. This
was apparent in a study in Spain early in the financial crisis.
This used data on patients attending primary care centres
in 2006–07 and 2010–11, before and during the economic
crisis [44]. All completed a standardised instrument de-
signed to diagnose mental disorders. There was a significant
increase in mental illness, after adjusting for the usual
socio-demographic confounders. In particular, there were
large increases in depression and anxiety and alcohol-
related disorders. As might be expected, job loss was a
major factor but so was getting into housing arrears or the
threat of eviction, independent of employment status.
That study had several limitations. It was based on
two cross sectional surveys, so we were not following up
Table 1 The health effects of the financial crisis
The health effects of the global financial crisis have been complex. Some
causes of death have declined, in particular road traffic injuries, as the
volume of heavy traffic on the roads diminished. But others increased,
such as suicides [72–74]. Yet this was not inevitable. The historical record
reveals that there was a clear link between job losses and suicides in some
countries, such as Spain. Yet in others, such as Sweden, there was no such
link. The difference was the strength of the welfare state, and specifically
investment in what are called active labour market programmes [75, 76].
These are programs that help people get back into work, providing
information and retraining and support for people with disabilities.
But more fundamentally, they are a means by which the state can
say that it cares about its people.
The situation with infectious disease was especially complex [77]. First,
the circumstances had to exist to rely a particular infection to emerge or
re-emerge. It was not plausible that malaria would emerge in Norway.
Second, there had to be a breakdown in those processes that had kept
it under control. Thus, cutbacks in vector control allowed malaria to
reappear in Greece. Cuts to a needle exchange program in Athens
contributed to an epidemic of HIV [78]. Abandoned swimming pools
following mortgage foreclosures in California provided breeding
grounds for the mosquitoes transmitting West Nile virus.
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individuals. There was also limited information about
the individual circumstances of respondents. At the
time, there were very few data following up individuals
during the period of the crisis. By about 2014 this
changed and the data from the EU’s Survey of Income
and Living Conditions became available for the early
years of the crisis [45]. Although it contained very few
questions on health, there were some, opening many
new opportunities do.
Another study of housing identified all respondents
from the then 27 EU member states who had no housing
arrears in 2008 and followed them to 2010, when many
more were facing situations that were precarious be-
cause of job losses and cuts to social protection [46].
Those transitioning into arrears experienced a deterior-
ation in their mental health, but only if they were renting
their accommodation. Those who owned their accommo-
dation experienced no deterioration, after adjusting for
other factors, consistent with the literature suggesting that
capabilities, such as ownership of assets, reduces vulner-
ability. Crucially, the effect of falling into rent arears was
independent of, and greater than job loss. Once again, the
effect varied among countries. In some, people were rela-
tively protected. In others, such as Belgium, Austria and
Italy, the effect was substantial.
A natural experiment in the UK offered an opportunity
to look a little closer at housing and health, in April 2011,
when the government reduced financial support for low
income persons renting in the private sector [47]. The
effect was substantial, with those receiving housing benefit
losing, on average, about €1,500 a year, greatly increasing
their precariousness. The prevalence of health problems
was compared in those receiving housing benefit, who
would suffer a loss, and those who not receiving it, who
would be unaffected. Given that this was amid the
economic crisis, it was unsurprising that even those
spared these specific cuts experienced some worsening in
mental health. However, the change was several times
greater among those whose housing benefit was cut.
It is, of course, important to look upstream, to ascertain
the causes of the causes. Why do some people experience
housing problems and others not? There are clearly many
individual factors, but are there aspects of government
policy that play a role, placing more people in situations
that are precarious in some areas rather than others? One
study looked at this within a single country, England,
seeking to explain variations in homelessness claims
between 2004 and 2012 [48]. As expected, reductions in
the economic activity in a local area were important.
These led to job losses and reductions in income,
with lower spending impacting on local shops and
service providers. But homelessness was also associ-
ated with reductions in welfare spending, and espe-
cially cuts to housing services and payments, as
expected, but also social care and income support for
older people.
Precarité de la sécurité alimentaire –
precariousness of food security
The final area related to precariousness is the ability
to feed oneself and one’s family. A study using data
from 21 countries revealed that food insecurity had
increased between 2004 and 2012 and this was asso-
ciated with both job loss and income reduction [49].
But, again, where robust social protection policies
were in place, the impact of rising unemployment or
stagnating wages on food insecurity was reduced. In
countries without adequate safety nets, people have
relied on charitable organizations, such as foodbanks,
to obtain food. In the UK, for example, there has
been a very large increase in the number of food-
banks and those using them [48]. Ministers have
attributed it to people being unable to manage their
finances, or spending their money of alcohol and cig-
arettes. Because the food is free, it is assumed there
is infinite demand. Yet these politicians seem not to
realise that people can only use a foodbank if they
are referred, typically by a doctor or social worker.
One study showed that the growth of foodbanks followed
job losses, cuts in welfare spending, and what are termed
sanctions, which temporarily stop welfare payments to
those claiming them [48]. Sanctions are deeply troubling
because they appear to disproportionately affect dis-
abled people and lone parents, [50] pushing them to
rely on the charity of others or, in some cases, petty
crime to feed their families [51, 52]. The government
claims that sanction encourage people back into work
but there is no evidence to support this [53].
To summarise so far, the financial crisis and the
subsequent imposition of austerity have impacted on
people in many ways. An estimated 5 million EU
citizens lost their jobs between 2008 and 2010. Many
others experienced reductions in income. Some lost
their homes and while there is no system for collecting
comparable data, surveys in countries such as Spain
and the UK suggest that numbers of homeless in-
creased by about 15% between 2008 and 2010. Others
went without food. Their lives became more precarious.
This meant that not only were they at greater risk of
misfortune but the consequences were worse when they
experienced it.
This is just the tip of the iceberg. Many who have
escaped these experiences live in constant fear of the
future. Their jobs and income may be secure for now,
but for how much longer? They can still afford their
homes, but will this continue? And if they must move,
what will this mean for getting to work, for their social
support networks, and for their children’s schooling?
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Beyond health: the political consequences of
precariousness
These findings show why health professionals should be
concerned about precariousness, as it impacts on the
health of some of the most vulnerable people in societies.
But there is another reason why society should be
concerned about the growth and persistence of a section
of the population who feel left behind, in a world charac-
terised by uncertainty.
The word precarious is related to the Latin, precor, to
beseech or to pray. Once, in the days when, to quote
Thomas Hobbes, life was nasty, brutish and short, those
whose lives were most precarious were likely to turn to
religion [54]. Some still do. But, at least in the twentieth
century, there were times when they turned to others
who promised a better future.
A recent study asked whether the austerity imple-
mented during the Weimar Republic contributed to the
rise of National Socialism [55]. This was a time of great
uncertainty. Unemployment rose steeply. Rampant infla-
tion destroyed savings. Many Germans emigrated, in
search of a better life in the new world. Using data on
voting patterns in the five Reichstag elections between
1928 and 1933 and on a variety of measures of the econ-
omy, including government spending and tax withheld
from wages, hourly wages and economic output, it was
possible, by means of a geographical analysis of patterns
in small administrative areas, to construct a dataset at
the level of constituencies. The findings revealed a clear
association between the depth of austerity and the rise
in support for the National Socialists. Crucially, this was
not simply the result of impoverishment. The very poor,
a group that was hit hard by job losses, tended to turn
to the communists. It was those just above them in the
pecking order who turned to the Nazis, the group who
had something to lose.
Of course, great care is needed in drawing parallels
with the events of the 1930s and 1940s in Europe. It is
almost unthinkable that the events of those years could
ever be repeated. But 2016 has surely shattered any
remaining complacency. In June, the United Kingdom
saw a small majority vote to leave the European Union,
encouraged by politicians who argued that the British
public had had enough of those “experts” who warned,
correctly, of the profoundly damaging consequences of
doing so. Donald Trump has been elected as President
of the United States, despite clear evidence of his un-
suitability, intellectually and temperamentally, for this
position of enormous responsibility.
These concerns are not confined to the Anglo-Saxon
world. Across Europe, parties attacking what is portrayed
as an out of touch establishment are attracting growing
support [56]. It now seems likely that Marine Le Pen will
reach the 2nd stage of the 2017 French presidential
election. In Germany, Alternative für Deutschland is
adopting a blatantly racist strategy. Elsewhere there is the
Swiss People’s Party, the Swedish Democrats, the True
Finns, Jobbik in Hungary, Golden Dawn in Greece and
Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom in The
Netherlands. The historical parallels are impossible to
ignore, with many of these parties using language reminis-
cent of the 1930s. Incredibly, a few have even adopted
symbols that draw explicitly on those of the Nazi era,
including variants of the swastika. In the USA, Donald
Trump has attracted support from not only from the Ku
Klux Klan but also from groups that identify explicitly
with the Nazis. One British activist on social media, who
closely observes the Daily Mail, a widely read tabloid
newspaper notorious for its support of the Nazis in the
1930s, posted comments on its articles online, quoting
verbatim from Mein Kampf and Der Stürmer, substituting
words related to migrants and Muslims for Jews [57]. His
comments received many “likes” and positive comments
from the newspaper’s readership. And many in the UK
were shocked by a UKIP (United Kingdom Independence
Party) poster picturing a line of migrants using the same
imagery as the Nazis. Donald Trump, when asked
repeatedly what was the difference between his pro-
posals to register Muslims in the United States and
the Nazi registers of Jews could only reply “you tell
me” [58].
Inevitably, scholars have sought to explain what is
happening, in some cases drawing on the Marxist con-
cept of false consciousness [59]. Recent analyses have
focused on the United States, including both scientific
studies and popular books. Among the most readable is
Thomas Franks’ book “What’s the matter with Kansas?”,
[60] exploring how conservatives have focused attention
on issues such as abortion and immigration as a means of
distracting attention from policies that damage those
whose votes they need to be elected, the white working
class, while Westen has examined this issue from the
perspective of psychology, exploring the role of cogni-
tive biases [61]. Others have looked at the role of the
media, and in particular the impact of Fox News. As Al
Franken, now the junior senator from Minnesota, has
noted, its coverage is anything but fair and balanced
[62]. Moreover, as one elegant study relating voting
patterns to its rollout on cable showed, it does have an
impact on voting behaviour. The messages promoted
by much of the media in the UK during the debate on
Brexit were not only blatantly dishonest, although in
this they were simply repeating unquestioningly what
some of the more disreputable politicians were saying,
but were also clearly racist. Subsequently, it has been
shown that Rupert Murdoch’s Sun newspaper can also
shift voting behaviour, even when it does not change
underlying values [63].
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Lipset [64] and Bell [65], in their classic studies of the rise
of fascism in Weimar Germany, Poujadism in France, and
McCarthyism in the United States, noted that support for
these extremist parties was concentrated among the petty
bourgeoisie, the small business people, shopkeepers, and in-
dependent farmers who had achieved comfortable lives but
saw it threatened by others, such as Jews, organised labour,
and communists. Lipset noted that “extremist movements
have much in common. They appealed to the disgruntled
and psychologically homeless, to the personal failures, the
socially isolated, economic league insecure, the uneducated,
unsophisticated, and the authoritarian persons” [66].
These findings are borne out by research in the wake
of the U.K.’s referendum. Those most likely to vote for
leave were the poor and unemployed, those looking for
work, people with low skills and those in precarious
manual occupations [67]. They are also supported by re-
cent research in Germany, which describes associations
between increased precariousness of work, greater social
insecurity and right-wing populist orientations [68].
There is an emerging group within many populations
that feel disconnected from what they see as a distant
establishment. Many of the certainties that they took for
granted, such as jobs for life, ever improving living con-
ditions, and children whose prospects were better than
their own seem to have vanished. They look around for
someone to blame and they do not need to look far. In
the shops, in the streets, and in the schools they see
people who look different. And when politicians also
point the finger of blame at those who look different, it
is far too easy for an increasingly precarious populous to
accept this narrative. What they do not see, of course, is
that these others are doing the jobs that they neither
want nor have the skills to do. They forget that their
health care systems manage only because they import
skilled workers from the rest of the world. They forget
that their elderly relatives are looked after by migrants.
And the newspapers they read conveniently overlook the
evidence that migrants make a positive contribution to
their economies. For anyone with a sense of history, it
should be deeply worrying. The vote in the UK should
surely be a warning that nothing can be taken for
granted. Many thought that it was inconceivable that so
many of the British people would vote against their own
interests in the EU referendum, but they did. The author
Charles Emerson has written a superb account of life in
the year 1913 in almost 30 cities across the world [69].
What is striking is that for almost all of those whose
stories are told, the carnage of the following 4 years was
equally inconceivable.
Anyone who believes in the enlightenment values of
evidence and enquiry, of tolerance and mutual respect,
and the more recent value of solidarity cannot ignore
those factors that are driving politics today. And this
means understanding the lives of those who see the
world in a very different way from academic researchers
and policy makers.
Conclusion
Those concerned about the health of the population,
and especially those most disadvantaged, must try to
understand the impact on health of the changes that are
taking place in society. Europe offers an incredible natural
laboratory to study these issues. The growth in precarious-
ness is not inevitable. While wages have stagnated in the
UK and Germany, they have risen in Finland and Slovakia.
Meanwhile, skyrocketing housing prices in the UK housing
contrasts with The Netherlands, which maintained stable
housing prices, even during the recessions of 2008. Sweden
has slowly reduced pension support, but France has in-
creased it for some older people. There are many different
responses that can be learnt from. Some, as the Danish
model of ‘flexicurity’, provide market freedom in employ-
ment but compensated by generous secure benefits, [70]
creating a situation where one can experience job
insecurity, but relatively low labour market insecurity,
with confidence in finding another job and sufficient
severance pay. Others, such as the German system of
rent and tenure controls, provide security in the housing
market [71]. All have strengths and weaknesses but they
offer many opportunities to learn from.
Yet there is another reason to be concerned. Democratic
systems are based on a social contract. And those with
power should not use it to breach that contract. That
can, as can be seen from history, have consequences
for everyone.
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